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Sitting Ducks The
Threat to the Chemical and Refinery Industry From 50 Caliber Sniper Rifles
Introduction Since
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, federal officials have warned the
chemical and refinery industry that hazardous-materials plants could be turned
into weapons of mass destruction.1 The attacks—which made enormously
destructive bombs out of passenger jets—woke the world to the fact that familiar
objects we tend to think of as relatively benign can become terrifying weapons
inflicting catastrophic damage: - A
study by the U.S. Army surgeon general concluded that 2.4 million people could
be killed or injured—in the worst-case scenario—if terrorists attacked a toxic
chemical plant in a densely populated area, and that about 900,000 such casualties
could occur in a middle-range scenario.2
- A
similar analysis by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) found that at least
123 plants in the United States keep amounts of toxic chemicals that could place
more than one million people in danger if released, 700 plants maintain amounts
that could endanger at least 100,000 people, and more than 3,000 plants maintain
amounts that could affect 10,000 people.3
- A
small-plane pilot, who one witness believes was Mohammad Atta, the suspected ringleader
of the September 11 attacks, showed great interest in a chemical plant in Tennessee
he had just flown over. The plant's storage tanks contained 250 tons of sulfur
dioxide, enough to kill or seriously injure as many as 60,000 nearby residents.4
These warnings
do not represent new knowledge. Counter-terrorism experts have for some time warned
that terrorists may target the chemical industry and other hazardous facilities.
For example, the possibility was addressed in a 1999 blue-ribbon panel report
to the President and Congress on the threat from chemical and biological terrorist
attack. After noting the obstacles to mounting an attack with actual chemical
weapons, the panel discussed an alternate avenue: Given
these impediments, a terrorist interested in harming large numbers of persons
might prefer to attempt to engineer a chemical disaster using conventional means
to attack an industrial plant or storage facility, rather than develop and use
an actual chemical weapon. In this way, significant technical and resource hurdles
could be overcome, as well as reducing the profile of the terrorist organization
to potential detection by intelligence or law enforcement agencies. Common industrial
and agricultural chemicals can be as highly toxic as bona fide chemical weapons
and, as the 1984 Bhopal, India, catastrophe demonstrated, just as (if not even
more) effective when unleashed on a nearby population.5 According
to the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, the Bhopal incident
referred to above involved the release of methyl isocyanate into the air and resulted
in an estimated 2,000 deaths and 100,000 injuries.6 Environmental
groups have added their voice to the government's warnings. For example, the activist
organization Greenpeace has in the past demonstrated the vulnerability of such
plants by skirting security to get inside sensitive facilities, and pointed out
the risk of attack mounted from outside typical security zones. "Unfortunately,
it's true that...terrorists could render any of these facilities or transport
of toxic chemicals a disaster without ever penetrating security," a Greenpeace
spokesperson said recently.7 The Natural Resources Defense Council,
an environmental advocacy organization, has sued the U.S. Department of Justice
for failing to submit a report to Congress—required by the Clean Air Act—on chemical
plant vulnerability.8 A coalition of environmental groups recently
issued The Safe Hometowns Guide, a guidebook outlining steps that communities
can take to reduce the risk from hazardous industrial locations.9 The
chemical industry has responded to this new threat by what one observer called
raising "the commitment to security to an unprecedented level."10 The
American Chemistry Council (ACC) promises to have a new security plan by June
2002 to supplement guidelines it issued in October 2001.11 According
to the ACC's existing guidelines, "The first step in constructing a solid security
program is to conduct a risk assessment—in other words, to take stock of the assets
that need to be protected, the threats that may be posed against those assets,
and the likelihood and consequences of attacks against those assets."12
This report provides
detailed information about a serious threat to refinery and hazardous-chemical
facilities: the 50 caliber sniper rifle and the armor-piercing, incendiary, and
explosive ammunition it is capable of firing accurately over thousands of yards.a
The U.S. Army's manual on urban combat states that 50 caliber sniper rifles are
intended for use as anti-materiel weapons, designed to attack bulk fuel tanks
and other high-value targets from a distance, using "their ability to shoot through
all but the heaviest shielding material."13 Few
would disagree that rockets and mortars in the hands of terrorists would present
alarming threats to refineries and hazardous-chemical facilities. But the general
public, most policymakers, many in the media, and even some who are responsible
for providing security to such facilities do not know that the 50 caliber sniper
rifle is the equivalent in firepower of rockets and mortars. Barrett Firearms
Manufacturing, Inc., the maker of the leading 50 caliber sniper rifle, states
the matter starkly in its own advertising material: With
decisive force and without the need for the manpower and expense of mortar or
rocket crews, forces can engage the opposition at distances far beyond the range
of small arms fire....The advantages are obvious when you consider that many of
the same targets for rocket and mortar fire can be neutralized...[by the 50 caliber
sniper rifle].14 Although
rockets, mortars, and other weapons of war are tightly controlled under existing
federal law, 50 caliber sniper rifles are no more regulated than traditional hunting
rifles and less regulated than handguns. As the VPC's earlier study Voting
from the Rooftops documents in detail, 50 caliber sniper rifles are proliferating
and have been purchased by terrorist groups, including Osama bin Laden's organization,
the Irish Republican Army, and domestic terror gangs. The
threat to the refinery and chemical industry can be neither fully nor seriously
addressed without taking into account the highly dangerous materiel destruction
capabilities of the 50 caliber sniper rifle, a weapon of war easily available
on the U.S. civilian gun market. a)
This report is drawn in substantial part from the broader October 2001 Violence
Policy Center report on the 50 caliber sniper rifle, Voting from the Rooftops:
How the Gun Industry Armed Osama bin Laden, other Foreign and Domestic Terrorists,
and Common Criminals with 50 Caliber Sniper Rifles.
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All contents © 2002 Violence Policy Center
The Violence
Policy Center is a national non-profit educational foundation that conducts research
on violence in America and works to develop violence-reduction policies and proposals.
The Center examines the role of firearms in America, conducts research on firearms
violence, and explores new ways to decrease firearm-related death and injury.
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